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THE ‘BRITISH JIHAD’ AND THE CURVES OF RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE  
 
ABSTRACT 
 
In exploring anti-civilian violence and alleged plots undertaken in the UK by small 
groups often termed ‘salafi-jihadi’ and popularly called ‘terrorists’, the essay attempts to 
present alternative routes of analysis.  The violent events or (alleged) plots seen recently 
in the UK present a political and sociological form that is different to state-centric or 
transnational migrant politics, including political Islam and communitarian Muslim 
identity politics.  The discussion of events in the UK extends to an analysis of a 
systematic pattern of association between small groups in the UK and Pakistani militias 
operating in Kashmir.  The origins and ideologies of the militias are explored and the 
dynamics of the militia movements in relation to UK events are considered.   
 
KEYWORDS Al Qaeda, terrorism, Dhiren Barot, Lashkar-e Tayyiba, Harakat-ul 
Mujahideen, Jaish-e Mohammed
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THE ‘BRITISH JIHAD’ AND THE CURVES OF RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Dhiren Barot was born in India in 1971 and grew up in a cul de sac near the centre of 
Kingsbury, a dull north-west London suburb.  Around 1992, he converted (reverted, he 
would say) to Islam, though whether he adopted a religion or embraced a political 
ideology is moot. In 2006, he pleaded guilty to planning a series of attacks targeting 
civilians in London using limousines filled with explosive fuels.  Currently, he is an ‘AA’ 
high risk prisoner on a thirty year sentence without parole.  Barot had argued that:  
 
...any project that can be carried out in the UK [means] that it is extremely 
possible to transfer (the project) to other parts of the world (Inshalla).  This is 
because security in the UK is probably the tightest in the world...the UK sets the 
benchmark (standard) for project feasibility / possibility (Allah s.w.t knows 
best).1 
 
Barot is often described as the most significant Al Qaeda figure captured in the UK.  
Khaled Sheikh Mohammed, the so-called ‘mastermind of 9/11’, i  a statement to the US 
Department of Defense Combatant Status Review Tribunal at Guantanamo Bay in 
March 2007, said he was responsible for the ‘surveying and financing for the destruction 
of the New York Stock Exchange and other financial targets after 9/11’. These same 
targets were ones that Barot had undertaken surveillance of (US Department of Defense 
2007, pp.18-19).  Barot is also claimed to be the person named ‘Issa al-Brittani’ who 
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, presumably following CIA interrogation that involved 
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waterboarding torture, said he sent to Malaysia and, under Bin Laden’s direction, to the 
US in early 2001 (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 2004, pp. 150, 514).  
 
Barot’s treatise about his experiences as a fighter for a militia active in Kashmir is 
an important document widely circulated in the UK (Al-Hindi 1999). The book, written 
under the kunya of Esa al-Hindi, was published by a Birmingham bookshop, the 
Maktabah al-Ansar, an important source for the dissemination of so-called ‘salafi-jihadi’ 
material in the UK.  His book exudes a piercing political sensibility, one occasionally 
poetic in it flourishes. His language as an operative is quite different:   
 
Even in suicidal missions we might not live long enough to deliver a very highly 
radioactive RDD [radioactive dispersal device] that uses gamma-emitting sources 
and is not shielded. If we tried to protect ourselves by shielding the source, the 
weight of the RDD could significantly increase thereby increasing the difficulty 
of delivering the device and causing successful dispersion of the radioactive 
material.2  
 
The formal register of this operational language is quite different from what is often seen 
as the irrational fanaticism of ‘jihadis’.  Barot openly calls his plans terrorist ones, 
intended to cause terror and chaos in London (unusually for this genre, he also refers to 
‘suicidal’ actions.) The Madrid public transport bombings and the death of 191 
commuters were considered by him to be a ‘respectable’ operation3.  
 
As early as 1999, before the invasion of Iraq and the 2001 attacks in New York, 
Barot was promoting ‘flank operations’ that were to be undertaken in western countries 
using great stealth (Al-Hindi 1999, p.116-7).  He was proposing this strategy in the late 
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1990s because of the awesome importance of Mullah Omar’s Islamic Emirate of 
Afghanistan.  For global visionaries who inhabited a specific political-intellectual 
universe, Taliban Afghanistan had world-historic significance.  It was apprehended as a 
near perfect state and society by many like Barot and Omar Khyam, a central figure in 
the 2004 ‘fertiliser’ bomb plot.  It was also viewed as an ideal base for military training 
that had to be protected from western interference.  Hence, the attention of key western 
countries had to be deflected away from Afghanistan through operations undertaken on 
their soil. 
 
Can migrant politics or the politics of migration make sense of Dhiren Barot and 
the tendencies he represents? This Special Issue is about the political mobilization of 
migrant groups and the paths through which migrants do or do not become politically 
‘incorporated’, ‘integrated’ or ‘assimilated’.  The absence of political ‘incorporation’ is not 
equivalent to a path towards political violence (as if the binary of democracy / terror 
completes all political possibilities, or sets apart two ideas that might be related in some 
circumstances.)  However, it is unclear that nation-focused and state-centric approaches 
can properly account for non-violent transnational migrant politics, let alone the real and 
alleged plots to commit violence against formal civilians that we have seen recently.   
 
If the paradigmatic events for migration studies are movements from the rural to 
the urban and from the ‘periphery’ to the west, Dhiren Barot’s key journeys exemplify 
the exact opposite. These ‘jihadi’ journeys make sense because affiliates are ‘integrated’ 
and competently ‘worlded’.  This ‘worlding’ can be reliant on peripheral urban to 
peripheral rural migration that bypasses the cosmopolitan metropolitan experience; or it 
can be based in largely metropolitan settings, and in travel from and through them rather 
than migration to them4; or it can depend on the social competencies required to 
Page 4 of 34
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rers  ethnic@surrey.ac.uk
Ethnic and Racial Studies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
Page 5 of 34 
navigate global cities, the ‘developing’ megacity and the most economically peripheral of 
rural spaces.  The social ‘worlds’ of Dhiren Barot’s included Britain, India, Pakistan and 
Kashmir, but also Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines and the US. The relevance of 
migration and migrant politics recedes amidst these different modes of transnational 
political competence and the new relations they make available or now engender – 
including new associations between very large transnational military, security and police 
institutions and the smallest of personal spaces in distant civil societies.  
 
ANALYTICAL ISSUES 
 
Since the London public transport bombings of 7 July 2005 by Mohammed Siddique 
Khan, Shehzad Tanweer and others, there have been copious analyses of what is 
characterised as ‘global terrorism’ and these dovetail with many post-2001 commentaries 
on Al Qaeda and terrorism.  The now common phraseology regarding ‘global terrorism’, 
‘terror networks’ or ‘global jihad’ is as evident in sober terrorism studies as it is in screeds 
that fantasise ‘Londonistan’, ‘Eurabia’ or a civilizational war in which something called 
‘Islam’ is determined to annihilate the west.  Similarly, ‘jihadi’ ideology is seen as 
coextensive with action: the word of the fanatic has become the violence it conjures. 
However, generalising approaches that invoke ‘global terrorism’ can elide many key 
distinctions between movements, groups, tendencies, ideologies and regions, and can 
become analytically pejorative in situations where specificity might be definitive.  We 
might summarize some of the sociological problems as follows. 
 
Topologies of omnipresence.  The spatial and organizational topology of the ‘global jihadi 
movement’ are characterised in many inconsistent ways.  It is a protean, shape-shifting 
transnational entity that refuses to settle on any one organizational form, but it is also 
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characterised as a social movement (e.g Wiktorowicz 2003) or a network (e.g. Castells 
2004), or an hierarchical organization with a clear identity (e.g. Gunaratna 2002);  or it is 
a fluid and dynamic entity comprised of socially ephemeral units (e.g. Sageman 2004) but 
which is nevertheless politically and ideologically rigid and doctrinaire and has enduring 
parts;  or it is an entity hidden within social interstices but can also be manifest – both 
covert and spectacular; or it is operationally highly competent, patient and sophisticated, 
or incompetent, amateur and relies on luck and determination; or it is an entity having 
clearly recognised boundaries; or it is a dispersed, cellular assemblage, both acephalous 
and polycephalous, locally autonomous and having no recognisable boundaries that 
distinguish it from the soci ties, religions or ‘civilizations’ in which it is manifest; or it has 
no existence except as a brand (‘Al Qaeda’) or franchise (Bergen 2002), an ideology 
(Burke 2004), a propaganda-media outfit (As-Sahab) or, simply, a metaphor that has 
causal powers across discontinuous times and spaces.  
 
The inability of current taxonomy to describe convincingly the varieties of politicized religion 
or contain them within categorical boundaries (on this, see Roy 2004.) Hence, each 
tendency is considered sui generis (such as Al Qaeda) or compressed into a tripartite 
taxonomy (reformist, radical, revolutionary; moderate, radical, extremist; Islamist, salafi, 
salafi-jihadi.) Taxonomic problems proliferate, especially when south Asian political 
movements enter the analytical fray, and they usually do.  Some analytical issues are a 
consequence of insufficient historical distance and an Al Qaeda-focused analysis starting 
from 2001 (such that the significant history of religious militias is taken to commence 
then) and working backwards into the Afghan jihad and the history of the Muslim 
Brotherhood or Wahhabi salafism from a perspective already settled by the 2001 events.  
This approach can generate an historical account overdetermined by ‘terror, terror, 
terror’ (Fisk 2006), one that necessarily solicits a distinctive political, ethical or emotional 
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partiality. Taxonomic issues also reflect difficulties in ascribing ideological boundaries to 
the phenomena.  Thus, much discourse moves fluidly from political Islamists to 
terrorists, from civilian resistance to military occupation to anti-civilian terrorism, from 
hijab to human bomb. Boundary issues might be empirically real (a few ‘liberal’ Brelwi 
movements also engage in sectarian violence and possess militias engaged in ‘jihad’), but 
also reflect deeply political issues – for example, both Israel and India have developed 
ferocious military strategies regarding colonized Palestine and Indian-controlled Kashmir 
as part of the US-led ‘global war on terror’. 
 
The dominance of the network analogy and the assumption of organizational consonance. The 
overwhelming view is that there is a transnational network – a sociologically corrigible 
‘global terrorist network’ which penetrates diasporas in the west. The desire to impute 
organizational consonance across the network is manifested in the plethora of terms (‘the 
global jihadi movement’, ‘global terrorism’, ‘terror networks’) that attempt to describe a 
unitary transnational entity, even if regional discriminations are subsequently elaborated. 
The assumption that there exists a global network that demonstrates organizational 
consonance and ideological familiality can nourish a political view of a tentacular global 
structure – or a high velocity phantasmatic intensity – that can strike civilians anywhere. It 
is not obvious that a geosocial topology based on the ‘network’ is necessarily valid, and 
its analytical use can displace other sociological dynamics, including non-linear 
transnational ‘sovereignties’ and the involvement of shadow states and parastatal militia 
combines (Bhatt 2007). Further, the network narrative of ‘global terrorism’ functions 
partly because of the absence of data about the current form, capacity, intentions or 
precise whereabouts of the genuine Al Qaeda. Alternatively, well-described empirical 
instances are universalized, or very different ‘networks’, events, histories and regional 
settings are conflated. The aim is often to demonstrate an association between events or 
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groups and Al Qaeda, either by showing a direct link, or by showing the involvement of a 
diverse armed groups that are designated by the US, UN, EU or UK as ‘terrorist’, and 
said to be ‘Al Qaeda-linked’ or ‘related’.  This is not to deny the existence of important 
transnational links, including ones to operatives who are incontrovertibly associated with 
Al Qaeda or who seek to accomplish major and horrifying atrocities.   
 
A definitive ideological lineage and the assumption of ideological familiality. The ubiquitous claim is 
of a definitive ideological genealogy that explains the phenomenon.  The claim rests 
alongside the desire to attribute ideological familiality to all ‘jihadi’ phenomena. The 
ideological lineage is seen to commence from the medieval al-Ghazzali and Ibn Taymiyya 
and travels via al-Wahhab to Hassan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb, Abdullah Azzam and finally 
to Bin Laden via the interpolation of al-Zawahiri and the ideology of Egyptian Islamic 
Jihad. The influences are usually post-1960s salafism, post-1970s Muslim Brotherhood 
ideology and the Afghan jihad (though the Taliban or Deobandi sects are usually seen to 
contribute little independent intellectual content.) The influence of ‘jihadi’ ideology is 
characteristically imagined in viral, epidemiological terms.  It is popularly seen to animate 
several ‘jihadi personalities’: the grimly calculating, the frenzied, the deprived, the 
damaged, the sexually aggravated and the brainwashed.  Hence also, the adiaphoric 
personality transforming instantly into the hostile one manifesting a fanatical haemophilia 
that has something to do with concupiscence and repression, primordial revenge and 
death fantasy. 
 
The foregrounding of one type of political violence, usually human bombs that target European 
and north American formal civilians.  The focus on human bombs, martyrology and 
gross events (such as beheadings in Iraq and Afghanistan) can distance attention from 
the routine violence of religious armed groups and elide the wide forms of political, 
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gender-based and sectarian violence enacted by them in different circumstances.  
Similarly, the common doublet of ideas regarding ‘terrorism as tactic’ and ‘terrorism as 
spectacle’ for a mass mediated global audience, can displace other ways of understanding 
political violence that are not completed by analytical recourse to either instrumental 
rationality or fanatical totalitarianism. Anti-civilian political violence need not exemplify a 
strategy or tactic, but this also does not imply that it is simply the manifestation of a 
xenocidal ideology. (Additionally, it is not the commitment to a metaphysics of violence 
that is exceptional – numerous political tendencies, from varieties of neoconservatism to 
revolutionary Marxism and revolutionary feminism make an ideological pledge to some 
form of political violence against some formal civilians in some circumstances for the 
greater good of all humanity, even if the pledge is perpetually deferred.) 
 
 
ATERRITORIAL PARAMILITIAS 
 
Since the US-led invasion and occupation of Iraq and the 2005 London bombings, there 
have been important transformations in orientations towards political violence among 
many political Islamists, theological and political salafis and several important ‘salafi-
jihadi’ clerics who formerly supported wider forms of political violence against civilians 
but have partially modified some of their former judgements.  The latter significantly 
include major ‘salafi-jihadi’ clerics, such as the Jordanian Abu Mohammed Asim al-
Maqdisi5, and the stern London-based Syrian advocate of jihad and takfir, Abu Basir al-
Tartusi, who said after the London bombings, though with qualification, that martyrdom 
operations were closer to suicide, a sin (As Sharq Al-Awsat 27.08.2005; As Sharq Al-Awsat 
01.09.2005).6 Theological salafism has also come under pressure from Saudi Arabia, 
which has made a concerted global effort to present Wahhabism and salafism as 
equivalent to peace and contrary to ‘terrorism’.  However, ‘terrorism’ and ‘innocence’ 
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URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rers  ethnic@surrey.ac.uk
Ethnic and Racial Studies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
Page 10 of 34 
have motile meanings. Hence, this Saudi effort routinely backfires because of the highly 
sectarian xenologies of many Saudi Arabian and other Gulf clerics, as well as their 
regularly ambiguous qualifications about different kinds of political violence. 
 
 More generally, the relations between ‘salafi-jihadi’ clerics and operatives has 
transformed, often substantially and in many detailed ways and some themes can be 
outlined here.  The broadest field of ‘salafi-jihadi’ theological opinion on legitimate forms 
of violence (including against Muslim and non-Muslim civilians, against women, children 
and the elderly, through beheadings and other mutilations, by human bombs and though 
insurgencies directed against states or formal civilian groups) is readily available. 
Opinions are supplemented by a potent philosophical anthropology, now definitive of 
several forms of salafism and ‘salafi-jihadism’, in which disavowal, enmity and 
dissociation constitute the natural human dispensation and xenological solidarity a 
natural condition (for example, Al-Fawzaan, 1997; Al-Qahtani, 1993). Even if 
judgements are abrogated by clerics who initially gave them, the abrogation can be 
dismissed as resulting from US or Saudi pressure. Operatives also readily make 
theological opinions: as major respected clerics have receded, the distinction between 
who is an operative and who a cleric has diminished, as has the difference – if there ever 
was a clear difference – between a jurisprudential opinion, a political opinion and an 
operational judgement.  Somewhat in parallel, the strategic distinction between small 
group acts against formal civilians and the incitement of popular violent insurgencies 
against armed occupiers or other formal civilians is frequently blurred. Hence, committed 
operatives do not necessarily require further theological legitimation for the 
‘uncontentious’ bulk of operations, including against civilians.  While there are strong 
countervailing trends that continue to appeal to the magical and supernal aspects of jihad 
(for example, Al Sahli, 2003; Surur, not dated), the orientation of operatives has shifted 
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from the theological, mystical or miraculous to the rational, strategic and operational, and 
this can be seen as a declension of the theological.  These factors do not mean religious 
jurisprudence is unimportant, but rather the relevant opinions are commonly understood 
to legitimise a wide field of operations against formal civilians, despite the prevalence of 
contrary religious opinions. Except for the most jurisprudentially contentious of acts, the 
choice between religious opinions is largely about political or strategic judgement rather 
theology. Strategically, there is a range of evolving ideas, ranging from the imperative to 
generate insurgencies to autonomous, covert cellular structures or independent lone 
individuals operating in the west, as suggested by key ideologues such as Abu Musab as-
Suri (Naji 2006; see also Lia 2007), or small groups making use of readily obtainable 
materials, as advocated by figures like Dhiren Barot.  
 
ONLY CONNECT 
 
These broader changes are relevant to the UK where there has been a string of high 
profile trials of those accused under expansive UK counter-terrorism legislation. Key 
trials have followed major police and security service operations.  These include the 
massive Operations Crevice (the ‘fertilizer’ plot), Overt (the ‘transatlantic airline bombing 
plot’), Rhyme (the group associated with Dhiren Barot), Mazhar (an important Internet 
group), Overamp (a group from London, with connections to individuals from the failed 
21 July 2005 London public transport bombings), Vivace (the latter failed bombings), 
Baguette (a Manchester group), Bivalve (an arrest at Luton airport) among numerous 
others.   In 2007, there were 257 arrests related to terrorism legislation or associated 
offences, of which 126 individuals were released without charge (Carlile 2008, p.67.)  
From 11 September 2001 to 31 March 2007, there were 1,228 arrests related to terrorism 
legislation or related offences, of which 669 individuals were released without charge.7 In 
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a few years, there may be up to a thousand such prisoners and their already evident 
political mobilization as ‘prisoners of war’ – the war being the ‘global war on terror’ – 
will become important.  Alongside are vocal demands from some prisoners regarding 
racism, anti-Muslim prejudice, human rights and the physical attacks upon them by other 
inmates. One might foresee something approaching the shape of the ‘H-Block’ 
campaigns of the Provisional IRA during the 1970s and 1980s, if the currently small 
prisoner campaigns gain symbolic momentum. Comparisons have been made with ‘gang 
structures’, including those of sectarian Republican and Loyalist prisoners. Political 
demands have not just arisen from the prisoners themselves:  Shehzad Tanweer, one of 
the July 2005 bombers, in a predictably slick video released in July 2006 by As-Sahab, Al 
Qaeda’s media wing, threatens an intensifying series of attacks in Britain unless it pulls its 
troops out of Afghanistan and Iraq, stops military and financial support to the US and 
Israel, and releases all Muslim prisoners from Belmarsh and ‘your other concentration 
camps’ (As-Sahab, 2006). Dhiren Barot has been attacked in prison with boiling oil and 
water and has complained bitterly about what he sees as the racism and Islamophobia he 
has faced from the criminal justice system and the media (Barot, 2007). Omar Khyam, 
convicted as the key organizer of the ‘fertilizer’ plot, has also been attacked, as have other 
Muslim prisoners. 
  
Of importance is the extent to which suspects, evidence or events in separate 
trials, including current or pending trials, are reportedly associated (raising a range of 
ethical issues about research in this area.)  Describing sociologically just the British links 
through terms such as ‘social movement’, ‘network’, ‘organization’ or ‘group’ is only 
partially sufficient and the network analogy undersupplies us with an convincing social 
topology of the UK ‘clusters’ and their transnational associations.  If it is relatively 
uncomplicated to show a network of ‘clusters’, it is far less easy to demonstrate the 
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genuine significance of ‘the network’, coherence within it, systematic organization across 
it, or the relevance of key personalities in animating it. Personal and familial bonds, 
organizational associations, and co-presence at events, militia training camps, cities and 
villages are evident in various cases. Online associations are regularly demonstrated.  
However, the ‘clusters’ are not necessarily existing socio-political groups but ones made 
distinct through criminal investigations (the network made visible through forensic, 
criminal and legal process is not necessarily the same as the geosocial network.) Much of 
the apparent configuration of UK clusters has resulted from intelligence obtained from 
(and therefore managed and constrained by the exigencies of) Pakistan’s intelligence 
services, through the confessions of a few key individuals or through confessions 
obtained through torture.  
 
Other important aspects remain to be described accurately:  changing 
transnational ‘jihadi’ pathways (especially post-2003), the anthropology of the militia and 
ideological camps and their substantial variety, the nature of different courses of 
instruction and training (though some of this is well known), the role of rural guides, 
instructors and camp amirs, the significance of peripatetic mercenaries, financial 
exchange, and other dynamics related to inter-militia relations.  Virtually unremarked is 
the dense and sophisticated aesthetic universe created by religious militias.  The aesthetic 
dimensions vary regionally but include consistent themes, motifs, lilt, nasheed, 
calligraphy, poetry and images. 
 
 Some information relevant to the UK is necessarily curtailed here and is 
described using public sources. But it is more accurate to speak of disparate ‘operational’ 
and propaganda ‘clusters’ in the UK, some of which overlap others, some of which show 
tenuous links with other ‘clusters’ or individuals, others which are (or currently appear to 
Page 13 of 34
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rers  ethnic@surrey.ac.uk
Ethnic and Racial Studies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
Page 14 of 34 
be) relatively independent, and others which show an indirect relation through the co-
presence of individuals at common events in the UK (though the latter regularly lead to 
an overemphasis on Al Muhajiroun and the Supporters of Sharia.)  Several key clusters 
demonstrate associations with each other via (the mediation of) Pakistani militias 
operating in Kashmir. Direct associations with ‘Al Qaeda’ have been either shown or 
regularly alleged, as in the 2005 bombings and the ‘fertiliser’, the 2006 transatlantic 
airline, the 2007 Birmingham ‘Muslim soldier beheading’ plots and the 2007 Glasgow 
airport attack.  However, what is meant by ‘Al Qaeda’ can be a figure from a militia 
operating in Kashmir. Some clusters are small and tight, others sprawling and 
unbounded, vanishing into quotidian sociality.  If one can speak of a prominent 
ideological shape, it includes the importance attached to Kashmir (and symbolically, 
Palestine), the attacks on Afghanistan, the 2002 Gujarat carnage, and the ideologies of 
Pakistani militias. Of key significance are ideological groups organised around (now 
former) key bookshops in the UK. In addition to the symbolic standing of Ayman al-
Zawahiri, Bin Laden, the late al-Zarqawi and the late Ibn al-Khattab (today’s Che 
Guevara), key inspirational figures include Abdullah Azzam, Masood Azhar, Hafiz 
Mohammed Saeed, Mohammed al-Maqdisi and Abu Qatada, but there is a very wide 
range of other figures exemplifying a diverse ideological universe. Some political and 
highly technical material is ubiquitous. 
 
 The diversity of the UK clusters, their relative unboundedness and the nature of 
their international associations are illustrated by briefly considering three real or alleged 
plots though, as we see, one plot quickly segues into others. Some of those arrested 
during Operation Crevice (the ‘fertilizer’ plot) have been associated with the 7 July 2005 
bombers and with two others later arrested and charged in relation to the latter. These 
associations between the July 2005 bombings and the fertilizer plot focus on Mohammed 
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Siddique Khan and Shehzad Tanweer’s associations with some of the Crevice plotters in 
the UK.  Individuals associated with the London bombings were also at camps in 
Mansehra or Malakand reportedly at the same time as individuals associated with the 
Crevice plot.  Mohammed Siddique Khan of the 7 July London bombings and Mukhtar 
Said Ibrahim of the failed 21 July 2005 bombings were also associated via a training camp 
abroad, and the latter was also associated with another recently convicted UK-based 
group.  Members of the 21 July failed plot were also reportedly associated with others in 
south London. Hence, both through the Crevice group and the ‘7/7’ bombers, the 
associations expand in many disparate directions. Characteristically, as shown in the 
Crevice trial, online communications involved dummy Yahoo accounts and draft email 
documents were used for communication.  
 
 Both the ‘7/7’ and Crevice clusters relate to religious militias operating in 
Kashmir. It is important to register the political potency of Kashmir for UK citizens 
whose parents or grandparents may have come from south Asia.  Kashmir’s ‘liberation’ is 
comprehensively entwined with secular Pakistani nationalism and regional Muslim 
religious absolutism.  Kashmir is similarly prominent in secular Indian and Hindu 
religious nationalism.  If ‘Kashmir’ bears symbolic power of considerable magnitude, this 
can intensify communal dynamics among south Asians in the UK.  It can also lead to the 
view that partaking of armed ‘jihad’ in Kashmir is a noble venture, irrespective of 
whether the venture is religious or secular. Omar Khyam, whose immediate family is 
secular, was said by him to have held a celebration for him because of his involvement 
with groups active in Kashmir (his extended family in Pakistan included staff in the 
military and intelligence services who found him at a camp and brought him home.)  
Dhiren Barot’s book is about his experiences in Kashmir and eulogises the Lashkar-e 
Tayyiba (LeT), the most powerful militia operating in Kashmir.  Barot’s book also speaks 
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highly of the Harakat-ul Ansar, Harakat-ul Mujahideen (HuM) and Al-Badr, militias 
operating in Kashmir that range from Deobandi to Islamist.   
 
 Another sprawl of associations between primarily propaganda clusters 
demonstrates an alternative topology.  Following Operation Mazhar, Younis Tsouli from 
Ealing and two associates were convicted in 2007 for inciting others to commit acts of 
terrorism (Economist 12.07.2007). Tsouli, under the name ‘irhabi007’ (‘irhabi’ meaning 
‘terrorist’, ‘007’ referring to a fictional drinking and womanizing secret agent of the 
British state, an unusual coalescence of ambitions), had been active in numerous online 
activities. He was also said to be associated with Al Qaeda’s military affiliate in Iraq and 
published al-Zarqawi’s propaganda (Guardian 5.07.2007). Tsouli was initially arrested 
because of phone records obtained during the arrest of a Swedish man in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. An online associate of Tsouli’s group was said to have attempted to 
smuggle plans for a rocket launcher (a Hamas Qassam rocket) into the UK.  Other 
online associates are linked to activities in the US, Canada and elsewhere.  
 
One association leads to At-Tibyan, an important (if intriguing) online publisher 
of English language translations of key ‘salafi-jihadi’ texts.  At-Tibyan’s theopolitical 
material provides a wide field of ‘salafi-jihadi’ judgements of the kind described earlier 
(though it has so far avoided publicising the more visceral judgements.) Another group 
of UK individuals has been associated with At-Tibyan in a legal case. At-Tibyan has also 
published material which was formerly to be published by Azzam.com, a website run by 
Babar Ahmed (among others) who is facing extradition to the US.  Babar Ahmed’s case 
relates to connections that range from the US to Chechnya (USA v. Babar Ahmad 2004, 
p.9). Since its closure, Azzam.com’s material has been published by the Maktabah al-
Ansar bookshop in Birmingham, which also published Dhiren Barot’s book on Kashmir. 
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The bookshop was reportedly co-owned by Moazzam Begg, who contemplated Taliban 
Afghanistan as a desirable holiday destination for his family, was held captive at 
Guantanamo Bay and later released. An individual who worked at the bookshop was 
arrested and later released without charge in relation to the 2007 Birmingham ‘Muslim 
soldier beheading’ plot.  This latter plot reportedly links to militias operating in Kashmir; 
it also relates to the shipping of equipment to Afghanistan, a theme in several cases.  
These connections can be expanded much further in several directions and from various 
‘nodes’, generating a sprawl of assemblages for which the network or the movement 
analytic seem like overdescriptions. 
 
 A third series of associations can be considered, starting with the ‘transatlantic 
airline liquid bomb’ plot in 2006.  The arrest of Rashid Rauf in Pakistan led to the UK 
arrests, enormous alarm across the Atlantic and the creation of new hand-luggage rules 
concerning liquid products (Independent 19.08.2006). Of significance in this (and several 
other) plots were the numerous ‘martyrdom’ videos that individuals had produced.  The 
language of political retribution and reprisal permeates these videos, as it does those of 
the July 2005 bombers, and this requires an explanation that moves beyond primitive 
vengeance. This plot also led to associations with militias in Pakistan and Afghanistan, 
including the important Jaish-e Mohammed militia operating in Kashmir.  
 
Significantly, the connections vanish into the fug of military-militia dynamics in 
Pakistan. For example, Rashid Rauf was initially characterised in Pakistan as a key ‘Al 
Qaeda figure’ and allegedly associated with various UK plots.  However, he managed to 
walk free from police custody (Dawn (Karachi), 18.12.2007) though he is now thought to 
have been killed in a US drone airstrike in North Waziristan. Similarly, Mohammed 
Naeem Noor Khan, a complex ‘key Al Qaeda’ figure from Pakistan, whose arrest led to 
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the arrests of Dhiren Barot, Babar Ahmed and others, was released without charge in 
Pakistan (Observer 08.08.2004; Guardian 23.08.2007.) This recurring pattern, which applies 
in a different way in the case of Omar Saeed Sheikh (below), is incorrigible unless the 
shadow state, the secret state and their associations with the ‘militia swarm’ are included 
in the pattern of transnational connections.  The smoke and mirrors in the way the 
Pakistani military and intelligence services manage the militias are an essential attribute of 
the sociological description.   
 
THE DYNAMICS OF THE ‘JIHADI CORRIDOR’ 
 
Hence, virtually every major plot or operation in the UK is associated with paramilitary 
or explosives training by Pakistani militias operating in Kashmir, or to training visits 
associated with Kashmir or Afghanistan. The future relevance of this pattern of militia 
training is unclear, in the sense that training abroad is not necessarily a requisite for 
further attacks.  However, the pattern of militia training can be seen as a sociological 
space that is called here, for convenience, a ‘jihadi corridor’ from the UK to Pakistan.  It 
is one of several ‘corridors’ that have existed from Britain to other countries.  A key one, 
which remains surrounded by considerable speculation, was the progenitor UK ‘convoy 
of mercy’ to Bosnia in the 1990s that also lead to the development of further patterns of 
travel from the UK to Chechnya.  Other ‘corridors’ linked the UK to Pakistan and then 
Afghanistan (through the Bosnia route, or directly.)  
 
If we consider the ‘corridors’ as sociological spaces, then their disruption or 
change can have significant consequences.  The exigencies within Pakistan – diverting 
returning militants from Afghanistan to Kashmir in the early 1990s, but also the 
subsequent impact within Pakistan from militias active in Kashmir – were noted by 
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figures like Dhiren Barot. One argument is that operations shifted to the UK after 2001 
because the ‘corridor’ from Pakistan to Afghanistan (more an expressway during the 
1990s) became progressively curtailed for foreigners and the ‘corridor’ from Pakistan- to 
Indian-controlled Kashmir, which cannot exist without military knowledge and 
connivance, was compromised after the nuclear brinkmanship between India and 
Pakistan following the Kargil episode during 1998-1999 (see also Abbas 2005). There is 
also evidence that individuals associated with Al Qaeda directed individuals to commit 
acts in the UK following the Iraq invasion (Burke 2008), seen as the last straw, as 
reported in the Operation Crevice trial. This does not explain why activities started in the 
UK before the March 2003 invasion of Iraq, including the Wood Green ricin plot (2002-
3) or the involvement of Richard Reid and Saajid Badat in the failed ‘shoebomber’ plot 
(2001).  Nor does it explain why individuals from the UK were regularly attending 
training in south Asia and returning home without fighting abroad well before 2003. 
 
 Evidence for the training of British citizens by Pakistani militias operating in 
Kashmir is consistent. Mohammed Siddique Khan reportedly trained in a Harakat-ul 
Mujahideen (HuM) camp in Mansehra district in the summer of 2001 with others from 
the UK (Guardian 21.05.08, 22.05.08.)  Shehzad Tanweer reportedly received training 
from a ‘Jaish-e Mohammed camp’ (JeM) near Islamabad and both Siddique Khan and 
Tanweer reportedly met with Lashkar-e Tayyiba (LeT) (Guardian 01.08.05; Daily Times 
(Lahore) 17.07.2005). During the Crevice trial, two individuals reportedly the same as 
Siddique Khan (‘Ibrahim’) and Tanweer (‘Zubair’) went to a training camp in Malakand 
district, Pakistan. Visits to training camps run by HuM and LeT (among others) were 
described during the Crevice trial.  During this trial, Omar Khyam interestingly dismissed 
the LeT as linked to the Pakistani intelligence services. Also of significance was the 
seemingly disordered way a group paid for training to be organised by a maulvi and his 
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‘militia’, reflecting the relative ease with which this was possible and its contingent 
nature. Mukhtar Said Ibrahim, of the failed 21 July 2005 bombings, reportedly attended 
an HuM training camp in Pakistan. He also attended the same training camp as 
Mohammed Siddique Khan in North Waziristan agency (Guardian 12.07.07).  Rashid 
Rauf, one of the plotters in the ‘transatlantic airline plot’ in 2006 (among others) was 
associated with Masood Azhar of the Jaish-e Mohammed militia operating in Kashmir, 
and was reportedly a member of a splinter from the latter.  The association with Masood 
Azhar included family ties between Rauf and Azhar (The Post (Pakistan) 27.07.2007; 
International Herald Tribune 18.12.2007; Guardian 28.01.2008). A series of arrests in 
Pakistan that precipitated the UK ‘airline plot’ arrests included allegations of connections 
to Matiur Rehman of the Lashkar-e Jhangvi (LeJ) (Observer 13.08.06). Other militias have 
also been implicated. These connections do not preclude direct associations with 
individuals in Al Qaeda, which have reportedly included Abdul Hadi al-Iraqi, Abu 
Obaidah al-Masri, Khaled Sheikh Mohammed, Abu Suleiman al-Jazairi, and individuals 
such as Mohammed Naeem Noor Khan, Dhiren Barot, Mohammed Junaid Babar and 
named others living in the UK and Europe.  
 
THE PAKISTANI ‘MILITIA SWARM’ 
 
While ‘Al Qaeda’ and the ‘resurgent Taliban’ remain in that order the key symbols in the 
demonology associated with religion, a third ‘actor’, the Pakistani religious militia swarm, 
has been largely evaded in analyses outside south Asia (Mir 2004; Abou Zahab & Roy 
2004; Abbas 2005; Rana 2005; Swami 2007; Hussain 2007.)  Also significant is the impact 
that alliances between militias might have regionally and internationally.  Sometimes, the 
militias merge or work together as militia combines such that it is unclear whether they 
are separate entities, or are distinct from what is called ‘Al Qaeda’. Conversely, what is 
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often referred to as ‘Al Qaeda’ is often these militia organizations. Another key 
dimension relates to militant regional movements referred to collectively as ‘the Pakistan 
Taliban’ and which inhabit the same geographical space as that used by Al Qaeda fighters 
(the two tribal agencies of Waziristan) or by the militias already discussed (Swat and other 
parts of NWFP.) 
 
Al Qaeda’s ‘International Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders’, 
initiated by Bin Laden in 1998, now includes five Pakistani militias:  LeT, HuM, JeM, 
Harakat-ul Jihadi-i Islami (HuJI) and Lashkar-e Jhangvi (LeJ).  Notwithstanding the 
Indian government’s sustained propaganda, the LeT reportedly ran the alliance following 
the US-led attacks on Afghanistan and Al Qaeda after 2001 (Times of India 12.08.2006; 
Raman 2005; Asia Times Online 12.08.2004.) While key Pakistani militias are members of 
Al Qaeda’s International Islamic Front, future militia assemblages might have the 
potential to become its symbolic competitors. The ‘Brigade 313’ and ‘Lashkar-e Omar’ 
alliances variously included LeT, JeM, LeJ, the interesting Harakat-ul Mujahideen al-
Alami / Jundullah group and HuJI.  Such combines represent a highly dynamic militia 
version of a sectarian Ahl-e Hadis – Deobandi political alliance, one now complicated by 
other regional militant movements (‘the Pakistani Taliban’). Sections of the Pakistan 
government, military or secret state have, at different times, actively fostered (rival) 
militia movements. At other times they are banned but allowed to operate relatively 
freely under a new name (LeT / Jamaat-ud Dawa / Falah-e Insaniyat Foundation, JeM / 
Khuddam-ul Islam).  At other times still the militias have been at virtual war with 
sections of the state or government. 
 
 The background of the main militias is important to address briefly since, in one 
sense, they have regularly contained some British links.  The first mainly Pakistani militia 
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fighting during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan was the Harakat-ul Jihad-ul Islami 
(HuJI).  This was formed in 1980 by the Jamiat Ulama-e Islami (JUI), a national 
federation of Deobandi clerics (a faction of which created the Taliban movement), and 
the Tablighi Jamaat, the transnational missionary organization misleadingly considered 
apolitical and quietist (Mir 2004, p. 117; Sikand 2003).  A major offshoot of HuJI was the 
Harakat-ul Mujahideen (HuM), formed in 1985, which is also associated with Tablighi 
sections.  In the early 1990s, HuJI, HuM and another militia merged under the name 
Harakat-ul Ansar (HuA). One of its key leaders and a formidable ideologue was Masood 
Azhar. His publications, tapes and CDs circulated widely in the UK during the 1990s and 
he visited the UK on several speaking and fundraising tours. Azhar’s writings and 
speeches, including Zaad-e Mujahid (Khubaib Sahib not dated) an ideological book for 
mujahideen on preparation for ‘jihad’, written while in jail in India, and his The Virtues of 
Jihad (Azhar not dated) are widely available in Britain (possession of the former was 
important in a further conviction emerging from the July 7 bombings.) 
 
 Ahmed Omar Saeed Sheikh, a British public schoolboy and LSE student, while 
on a ‘convoy of mercy’ to Bosnia in the early 1990s, become involved with the Harakat-
ul Ansar (Mir 2004, pp.56-66).  Masood Azhar of the HuA was arrested in Indian-
controlled Kashmir in 1994 and Omar Saeed Sheikh was later arrested in India for 
plotting to kidnap westerners in order to force the Indian government to release Azhar. 
Following the hijacking of an Indian Airlines flight in 1999, supposedly by an ‘HuA’ 
front group, Masood Azhar and Omar Saeed Sheikh were released and returned to 
Pakistan. One of the hijackers was Amjad Farooqi who became a key figure in the 
Lashkar-e Jhangvi (LeJ), the militia offshoot of Sipah-e Sahaba (SSP), an extremely 
violent sectarian organization in Pakistan that turned to massacring Shia leaders in 
Kashmir (Abbas 2005, p. 208.)  In a very important sense, the SSP’s violence established 
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a key precedent for many of the tendencies described in this essay. On release, Masood 
Azhar announced the formation of the Jaish-e Mohammed (JeM). Like the LeT, the 
Jaish-e Mohammed is a massive social, political and militia movement.  Omar Saeed Sheikh 
was convicted for the kidnapping and murder by beheading in 2002 of the Washington 
Post journalist, Daniel Pearl, who was investigating the involvement of Richard Reid, the 
failed UK shoebomber, with these militias and with the Tablighis (Guardian 23.02.2005;  
USA versus Ahmad Omar Saeed Sheikh 2002; Mariane Pearl versus Ahmad Omar Saeed Sheikh 
and others 2007). Amjad Farooqi, now dead, was named as involved in the murder, and 
Khaled Sheikh Mohammed said that he beheaded Daniel Pearl.  The various tendencies 
that culminated in this murder show, perhaps emblematically, the early involvement of 
individuals from the UK, the convergence of several ideological and sectarian groups, the 
presence of militias independent of Al Qaeda and individuals from the latter.  
 
The militias are politically rather than just militarily definitive:  several Deobandi 
groups during and in the aftermath of the Afghan jihad had developed a powerful 
‘global’ ideology. For example, the Jaish-e Mohammed’s motto is ‘jihad against the 
infidels and struggle against infidelity to faith [i.e. against other Muslims]’ (Azhar, quoted 
in Rana 2005, p.225.) In this curt statement, Azhar’s ideology illustrates two key 
dynamics: firstly, the tripartite struggle – locally in Indian-controlled Kashmir, against 
India itself (to ‘reclaim’ it as ‘Muslim territory’ that was once part of the ‘Caliphate’), and 
planet-wide to establish God’s justice and truth everywhere; secondly the need to 
discipline Muslims ‘internally’ while fighting unbelief ‘externally’. These south Asian 
‘global’ ideologies cannot be viewed as unsystematic and disorganised in comparison 
with the lineage of violent salafism arising from Saudi Arabia and Egypt from the 1970s, 
nor are the former a simple consequence of the latter.  (Distinctively, they contain the 
idea of a Hindu-Zionist-Crusader alliance encircling and threatening Muslims globally.) 
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 This argument also applies in the case of the most powerful Pakistani militia, the 
Lashkar-e Tayyiba (LeT), an offshoot of one sect of the Ahl-e Hadis movement in 
Pakistan and so ideologically closer to Wahhabism. The LeT was created by Hafiz Saeed 
in 1990 as the military wing of the Markaz-ud Dawa wal Irshad founded by him and the 
late Abdullah Azzam, a Muslim Brotherhood figure who is usually portrayed as bin 
Laden’s political mentor. Like HuJI, the progenitor Deobandi militia, the LeT from its 
inception was operating beyond Kashmir, Afghanistan and Pakistan. LeT members have 
been found in Chechnya, China, India8, Bosnia, south-east Asia and recently in Iraq (Mir 
2004, pp.104-5; Rana 2005, p.334).  LeT fundraisers have been active in the UK for 
many years.  Allegations have been made that LeT and JeM activists in the UK formed 
an important first step in the ‘jihadi corridor’ to Pakistan, Kashmir and Afghanistan, and 
the LeT has been directly implicated in the training of individuals from the UK.  
Ideologically, the LeT makes little distinction between its desire to plant ‘the flag of 
Islam’ in Delhi, London and Washington and its struggle in Kashmir. India, but also 
Hindus, Sikhs and Buddhists are key symbols in its demonology. Similarly, the idea that 
killing Americans, ‘looting their wealth’ and ‘enslaving their women’ was permissible, 
since they were infidels warring against Islam and Muslims, was well-established among 
Ahl-e Hadis or Deobandi militias by the early 1990s and did not require Al Qaeda’s 
interpolation.  
 
 During the 1990s, religious militias in south Asia spoke not just of the Afghan, 
Kashmir, Chechnyan or Bosnian jihad but the idea of jihad in an abstract sense, one 
linked to a planetary struggle against kufr and kaffir, or to a cosmic struggle to establish 
God’s truth and justice worldwide and to save the entire humanity from kufr. The 
political language inverts the order of priorities:  the Kashmir jihad becomes important 
Page 24 of 34
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rers  ethnic@surrey.ac.uk
Ethnic and Racial Studies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
Page 25 of 34 
because of the anterior necessity of ‘global jihad’. There is therefore an interesting set of 
dialectics between the territory of the planet, all the lesser ‘Caliphate territory’ conceived 
to be historically ‘Muslim’ and apparently having borne the law and footprint of the 
believer (Roy 2004, p.112), and the regional struggle against military occupation. The 
Kashmir jihad is coextensive with the jihad to ‘reclaim’ all of India, which is equivalent to 
the jihad to establish planetary peace under God’s law.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The ‘geographical’ movem nt from a north-west London suburb to Pakistani militia 
movements operating in Kashmir highlights elements of a sociological process and a 
political form that governs those who aspire to become involved with aterritorial 
religious absolutist paramilitias. The novel connections between British youths and 
Pakistani militias operating in Kashmir and Afghanistan reflect a militarized political 
association between very small groups in the ‘diaspora’, militias abroad, and elements of 
the shadow state.  Through their travels, a small group of young British men have 
enabled a range of associations between youths in the UK and militias abroad.  Their 
movements have engendered new associations between international military and 
security apparatuses, groups in the ‘diaspora’ and a variety of states and parastatal bodies, 
associations that will spawn new political dynamics long after the ‘global war on terror’ is 
over. This situation adds an altogether different dimension to the ‘politics of the 
diaspora’, since militias largely created and partially managed by the Pakistani secret state 
have trained British youths who want to undertake anti-civilian operations in the UK.  It 
is a highly contentious but moot point whether Al Qaeda’s agency was necessary for the 
major plots or operations in the UK. As the new US administration, with British 
assistance, undertakes more intensive and direct military assaults within Pakistan’s 
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sovereign territory, other potent communal dynamics, converging with secular-nationalist 
ones, will proliferate.  
 
It has become possible for many to apprehend ‘salafi-jihadi’ politics solely 
through the perspective of resistance to military occupation or the exigencies of a war 
situation.  But consider these words of Masood Azhar, leader of the Jaish-e Mohammed: 
 
...it is to express to the unbelievers that all Muslims are like one body, so to touch 
or cause harm to any part of the body is like challenging the whole body.  
Similarly, to lift the hand against a Muslim’s life, wealth or honour is similar to 
challenging the whole nation of the Muslims. (Azhar not dated, p. 132.) 
 
This philosophy of unconstrained spatial and temporal consequentialism may converge 
with that of Al Qaeda but is also independent of it.  It takes each individual on the planet 
as in principle embodying responsibility for actions and consequences anywhere and 
anywhen.  Rather than the dehumanization of the enemy that ‘salafi-jihadis’ are regularly 
accused of, it is a recognition of fully human political capacity.  It is not that concerns 
about genuine military occupations are removed from this latter political form, but that 
they are intended to make sense only in that form.  This is quite different from the 
formalities of political Islamist or communitarian Muslim identity politics in the UK. It 
demonstrates instead a desire by a small virtuous group to usurp the law of humanity and 
settle upon a precise identification between cosmos and nomos (Arendt, 1973).  Key ideas 
about virtue (the ‘character of character’) and approbation (akin to the honouring of 
moral character) recur in ‘salafi-jihadi’ discourse. A politics of virtue and character can 
exist relatively unbridled by the impersonal rule-imperative forms of ‘the political’ that 
are otherwise hosted by modernity.  These ideas of virtue and approbation have 
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remained the ‘dangerous supplement’ as well as the heady companion to normative 
modern political forms based on abstract judgement and impersonal procedure. They 
equally show considerable distance from domestic and transnational ‘migrant’ politics 
typically based on rights, distribution and recognition:  if the secular father was arrested 
for making petrol bombs in anticipation of an attack by neo-Nazis or racist police in the 
midst of violent urban events occurring nationally, the anti-secular son is arrested for 
wanting to cause explosions among civilians for reasons that are at once secular and are a 
product of a political religion, one in which the worlds of the living have become mixed 
up with the worlds of the dead. 
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NOTES 
                                                 
1 ‘Rough presentation for Gas Limos project’, chapter 4, page 16. Document attributed to Dhiren Barot 
and obtained from computers searched during Operation Rhyme.  
2 ‘Final presentation’, page 3. Document attributed to Dhiren Barot and obtained from computers searched 
during Operation Rhyme.  
3 ‘Rough presentation for Gas Limos project’, page 35. Document attributed to Dhiren Barot and obtained 
from computers searched during Operation Rhyme. 
4 It is not an accident that a key media organiser for Al Qaeda and an important communicator of its ideas 
is Adam Pearlman, a ‘white’ American of part-Jewish, part-Christian parentage. It would thwart current 
‘profiling’ measures in Europe and America if future attacks are undertaken by white, female or mixed 
groups with no south Asian or middle-Eastern members directly involved in the attack itself. 
5 Maqdisi’s writings are available at www.tawhed.ws / www.almaqdese.net, including his Hadhihi Aqeedatuna 
and Millat Ibrahim. 
6 See http://www.en.altartosi.com/suicide.htm#B.  Tartusi’s statement of creed is at 
http://www.en.altartosi.com/Creed.pdf. 
7 http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/security/terrorism-and-the-law/, accessed 29 June 2008. 
8
 The massacre of civilians in Bombay in November 2008 was undertaken by the LeT, which has also 
previously attacked the Indian Parliament and the Red Fort in Delhi.  
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